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 ABSTRACT 
HOW SMART IS YOUR ANDROID SMARTPHONE? 
by Deepika Mulani 
Smart phones are ubiquitous today. These phones generally have access to 
sensitive personal information and, consequently, they are a prime target for attackers. A 
virus or worm that spreads over the network to cell phone users could be particularly 
damaging. 
Due to a rising demand for secure mobile phones, manufacturers have increased 
their emphasis on mobile security. In this project, we address some security issues 
relevant to the current Android smartphone framework. Specifically, we demonstrate an 
exploit that targets the Android telephony service. In addition, as a defense against the 
loss of personal information, we provide a means to encrypt data stored on the external 
media card. While smartphones remain vulnerable to a variety of security threats, this 
encryption provides an additional level of security. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Mobile phones are no longer devices restricted to making voice callsthey can run most 
of the processes that one expects from a desktop computer. Mobile phones are equipped with 
applications such as e-mail clients, chat clients, short messaging service (SMS), and multimedia 
messaging service (MMS). Most smartphones are equipped with cameras so that one can have 
personal pictures and videos on the phone. Communication between two mobile devices is no 
longer limited to the services of a GSM provider. One can have two mobile phones communicate 
with the help of Bluetooth, external media cards, or the Internet. Thanks to the efforts of the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), being away from one’s 
laptop does not mean being disconnected from the rest of the Internet world.  
The first mobile phone virus, Cabir, was created in 2004 and targeted for Symbian OS-
based phones. This virus replicated itself on Bluetooth wireless networks [1]. Since then, there 
have been many similar versions of the virus and a few new ones. However, the number of 
mobile phone viruses is significantly fewer than computer viruses. 
One major difference between PC and mobile phone viruses has been that it is more 
difficult for mobile virus infections to spread as fast as computer viruses can. This is due to the 
variety of mobile platforms; lack of documentation and lack of support tools has led to less 
exploitation of vulnerabilities [1].  
However, the trend has been to synchronize computers with smartphones. Hence, the 
threat to all critical and private data has become twofold. Even worse is that smartphones come 
with a built-in billing system; a virus can cause immediate financial loss. Most of the threats 
interrupt user productivity, drain the battery, increase messaging charges, and have the potential 
to damage users’ reputations.  
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With the rich variety of data centric applications available, it is important that the 
smartphone be made smart to preserve user privacy. Various platforms have evolved in the 
process to achieve this goal. Some of the current mobile platforms such as Symbian, Android, 
and so on, have taken steps to ensure that their architecture is build around security.  
1.1 Objective of the Project 
The objective of this project is to identify security holes and any missing security features 
in Android’s architecture. Using this as a starting point, the goal is to develop a prototype 
application that serves as a justification for our findings. 
1.2 Order of the Project 
Section 2 begins with a discussion of the Android security architecture and some of its 
limitations. Section 3 briefly covers the security architecture of iPhone and Symbian, comparing 
them with Android’s architecture. Section 4 lists some mobile phone risks, and Section 5 briefly 
covers some of the best practices that users of smartphones should follow for their personal 
security. 
Section 6 discusses in detail the telephony exploitation that we have successfully 
deployed on Android phones. This malicious behavior tries to breach the user’s privacy by 
retrieving all his or her contacts and sending an SMS message on each incoming voice call. It 
also prevents the user from dialing any numbers, hence exploiting the most basic feature of a 
phone.  
Section 7 covers the implementation details and limitations of the security enhancement 
we have developed for dealing with external data. In the current Android framework, each 
application has private access of the data stored on the internal phone memory. However, this is 
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not applicable to data stored on an external media card. In our solution, we encrypt the data 
being written to external media and store the encryption key on the phone memory, which is 
private to the application that uses this solution. 
Section 8 concludes our work and reiterates our goals and achievements while studying 
the security architecture of smartphone operating systems, and provides the scope for further 
study.  
2.0 Android Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
Android is the mobile phone platform led by Google’s Open Handset Allowance (OHA). 
Android has a unique security model in which the user is in complete control of the device. It is 
an open source platform based on Linux. All applications are written in Java and compiled into a 
custom byte-code (DEX) [6]. Each application executes in its own process with its own instance 
of the Dalvik virtual machine interpreter [2]. 
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Figure 1. Android architecture [6] 
 
2.2 Application behavior 
Every application in Android runs as a separate process with a unique UID, unlike a 
desktop computer where all the applications run with the same UID. The UID of an application 
in Android protects its data. Programs cannot typically read or write each other’s data, and 
sharing between applications must be done explicitly [3]. Due to this feature, a compromise such 
as a buffer overflow attack [3,17] is restricted to the application and its data. However, it is 
important to note that an application can launch another program that will run with the launching 
application’s UID.  
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For a developer to run an application on the Android phone, his or her application needs 
to be signed. Developers can generate self-signed certificates and use this for code signing. Code 
signing is done to enable developers to update their own applications without creating 
complicated interfaces and permissions.  
2.3 Application components 
Applications are comprised of components. Components interact using Intent messages 
[6]. Recipient components assert their desire to receive Intent messages by defining Intent filters 
[6]. There are four types of components used to construct applications:  
1. Activity components interact with the user via the touchscreen and keypad. Only one 
activity is active at a time, and processing is suspended for all other activities [5]. 
2. Service components provide for background processing when an application’s 
activity leaves focus and another GUI application comes in the foreground [6].   
3. Broadcast receiver components provide a general mechanism for asynchronous event 
notifications [6]. The receivers receive Intent messages that are implicitly addressed 
with action strings; for instance, dialing a number is associated with the action 
OUTGOING_CALL_ACTION.  
4. Content provider components are the preferred method for sharing data between 
applications [5]. These APIs implement an SQL-like interface; however, the backend 
implementation is up to the application developer.  
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Figure 2. Android applications component IPC [3] 
 
2.4 Application level security framework 
Applications need approval to do things their user might object to, such as sending SMS 
messages, using the contacts database, or using the camera. To keep track of what the application 
is permitted to do, Android maintains manifest permissions that are enforced by the middleware 
reference monitor. The permission label is a unique text string that can be defined by the OS as 
well as by a third-party developer. These permissions indicate what resources and interfaces are 
available to the application at run-time. An example of a permission is READ_CONTACTS, 
which permits the application to read the user’s address book. In addition to reading and writing 
data, permissions allow applications to access system services such as dialing a number without 
prompting the user or taking complete control of the screen and obscuring the status bar.  
A developer should specify all permissions that his or her application requires in the 
AndroidManifest.xml file; however, it is not necessary that all permissions be granted. When the 
application is getting installed, the user has the choice to decide whether or not to trust the 
software based on the application’s promised features. and the permissions required. These 
permissions are different from file permissions. Once an application is installed, its permissions 
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cannot be changed. The fewer permissions an application needs, the more comfortable the user 
should feel installing the application.  
Permissions have a protection level. The four protection levels are outlined in Table 1.  
Table 1. Android manifest permission protection levels [2] 
Normal 
Permissions for application features with minor consequences such 
as VIBRATE, which lets applications vibrate the device. Suitable for 
granting rights not generally of keen interest to users; users can 
review but may not be explicitly warned.  
Dangerous 
Permissions such as WRITE_SETTINGS or SEND_SMS are 
dangerous as they could be used to reconfigure the device or incur 
tolls. This level marks permissions in which the users will be 
interested or be potentially surprised. Android will warn users about 
the need for these permissions on install.  
Signature 
These permissions can be granted only to other applications signed 
with the same key as this program. This allows secure coordination 
without publishing a public interface.  
SignatureOrSystem 
Same as Signature except that programs on the system image also 
qualify for access. This allows programs on custom Android systems 
to also get the permission. This protection is to help integrate system 
builds and won’t be typically used by developers.  
  
The permission label policy is used to protect applications from each other and also 
various components within an application. In the mobile phone environment, it is difficult for the 
operating system to manage access control policies of hundreds of unknown applications. 
Therefore, Android simplifies this by having the developers define their permission labels to 
access their interfaces. By doing so, the developer does not need to know about existing and 
future applications; permission labels allow the developer to indirectly influence security 
decisions. 
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2.5 Files and preferences 
Android uses UNIX-style file permissions [2]. Each application has its own area on the 
file system that it owns [2,16]. This is similar to programs having a home directory to go along 
with their User IDs. This feature is limited only to the internal phone memory and not the 
external memory. The standard way for applications to expose their private data to other 
applications is through content providers [16].  
2.6 Android limitation 
The current security policy of Android works on a static level only during installation to 
identify whether the application is permitted all the requested permissions from the user. Once 
the permission is granted, there is no way to govern to whom these rights are given or how they 
are later exercised [3]. Permissions are asserted as vague suggestions as to what kinds of 
protections the application desires. One must place good faith in the user and the OS to make 
good choices about permissions granted to the application which, in many cases, may not be the 
absolute best  choice.  
Due to the above architecture, Android system libraries have limited ability to control 
installed third-party applications that can be granted permissions to use their interfaces. This 
implies that there is no control to restrict an installed application based on its signatures. Further, 
it is not possible to define the desirable configurations of an installed third-party application such 
as the minimum version and the set of permissions it is allowed or disallowed. 
This implies that Android applications built with the right set of permissions protect the 
system from malicious applications but provides severely limited infrastructure for applications 
to protect themselves. 
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3.0 iPhone and Symbian Mobile Frameworks 
iPhone and Symbian are the two popular competitors of Android smartphones. Each of 
these platforms has its own security model. A comparison of these architectures is essential to 
understanding the current trends in mobile security. 
3.1 iPhone security architecture 
iPhone’s security features include encryption of data in transit and authorization by 
strong passwords to corporate services. On iPhone 3GS, there is a new enhancement of hardware 
encryption of data stored on the device [12]. Users of the device can be restricted from accessing 
certain features by setting up device restrictions through configuration policies.  
iPhone also comes with the feature of remote wipe, which is helpful in case of the device 
being lost or stolen. The user of iPhone can login to his or her web account and issue the remote 
command to securely wipe the the phone’s data, making it unrecoverable.  It also supports 
erasing of data from the device after a certain number of failed authorization attempts. To 
provide secure access to corporate data, iPhone also integrates with VPN technologies [12]. 
It is mandatory that all iPhone applications be signed. Third party applications are 
required to be signed by developers with an Apple-provided certificate. Runtime protection is 
also available, which ensures that an application has not become untrusted since the last time it 
was used. This is an important security feature that the Android platform lacks. 
Apple’s app store is a guarded community. The apps that get listed have been certified by 
Apple. The developers of the apps are required to be registered and pay annual subscription fees. 
The app and each of its versions is evaluated by the Apple team, and any app that can potentially 
pose a threat to personal data, contains inappropriate content, or breaks the law is rejected by 
Apple.  
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At Google’s Android marketplace, the approach is fundamentally different: Any 
application can be uploaded to the marketplace, and Google does not evaluate these apps. What 
protects Android users from these apps is the concept of “capabilities” or “permissions” [8]. 
At installation, each app tells the Android OS what capabilities it requires. Based on the 
usage and claim of the applications, it is up to the user to decide if the capabilities are 
reasonable [8].  
This system has the advantage of being enforced by a true platform. An application 
cannot exploit any other resources to which it is not entitled. However, the disadvantage of this 
trust system is that there is no way to be sure that an application will limit itself within the 
defined boundary once it is installed. Any application can request capabilities and appear 
legitimate on the surface, while in the background, it may be doing something malicious.  
The bigger problem is that the marketplace relies on the user’s ability to evaluate the 
risks of the application they want to download and run. Not all users are aware of security threats 
and ways that their information can be compromised.  
3.2 Symbian’s security framework 
Symbian was one of the first smartphone operating systems, with its first phone based on 
Symbian v6.0, released in 2001. Nokia acquired Symbian Software Limited in 2008 and, in 
February 2010, Symbian source code became available as open source [14].  
To free the users from the task of deciding about security of an application, Symbian OS 
released Symbian v9.x, which introduced the concept of platform security. This includes 
capabilities and Symbian signing. In early 2005, Symbian 9.1 was released and can run 
applications that pass the constraints set by both the Android and iPhone platforms. This means 
that, just as in Android, an application needs to enlist permissions or capabilities that its APIs 
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will use. This is exactly the UNIX-style permissions per process-based model; however, unlike 
Android, this application is not available for market use without the signing process.  
There are two types of certificates used by the Symbian community: A developer 
certificate is used by the developer to sign his or her application and run on a specific phone. 
This developer certificate contains the requested capabilities of the application but is confined to 
run only on certain phones as specified by the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) 
which are mentioned in the certificate request process. It is not possible to request more than 20 
IMEI numbers in a developer certificate. This means that a malicious application does not spread 
extensively as soon as it is developed.  
The second certificate is the Symbian Signed Certificate, obtained through the Symbian 
signing process. Just like iPhone, a Symbian application needs to be signed by a certifying 
authority before deploying the application in the market. There is a cost associated with each 
signing. One needs a publisher ID from Verisign, which costs $200 per year, and the Symbian 
signing process has an additional cost of around $300 [9] per signature.  
Once the application is ready to be deployed, it needs to be submitted to the Symbian 
signed site [15]. There, the application is tested against criteria specified by Symbian. After the 
testing is successfully completed, the application is certified and returned to the developer, who 
can then distribute the application. This process is shown in Figure 3. 
Since signing has a cost associated with it, it is unlikely that virus writers will be 
submitting their apps for Symbian signing, in which case it is not possible to distribute malicious 
applications. 
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Figure 3. Symbian certification and signing process [10] 
   
 The Symbian signing process implies that the only likely way to hack a Symbian phone is 
by disabling its platform security feature. Once this is done, an unsigned application can be 
installed. Once platform security is disabled, the phone is at risk, allowing access to system files, 
changing how the operating system works, and access to a wide variety of viruses, malware, and 
so on.  
 Therefore, the best a user of a Symbian smartphone can do is never to disable platform 
security. Developers must not install applications signed with a developer certificate that can 
internally disable platform security. It is not possible for attackers to do so as a developer 
certificate can be obtained for a maximum 20 IMEI numbers and it is not possible to guess IMEI 
number of any phone. 
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 Theoretically, Symbian’s platform security concept is more powerful than the security 
model employed by current Android and iPhone smartphones because it is a fusion of the best 
features of these two platforms’ security architecture.  
 With the advent of smartphones and the variety of information these can hold, it is 
necessary that the users of such phone become educated about the various intricacies and 
security risks involved in their use.  
4.0 Mobile Phone Risks 
 The more popular an operating system, the more likely it is to be infected by a virus—
just as in the PC world. Microsoft Windows is more often subject to malicious attacks than is 
Apple Macintosh. Similarly, in the mobile world, Android, iPhone, and Symbian-based phones 
are the most popular targets for attack. Several risks factors indicate that most of the mobile 
market is ripe for powerful new attacks. Some of these are:  
1. Proof of concept viruses and variations of these have been published on the Internet 
(e.g., Cabir virus provided a code base for VLASCO.A and DAMPIG.A) [7].  
2. Most phones do not have security software or security policies [7].  
3. Smartphones are capable of high-speed data transmission [7]. 
 Closed devices are less likely to be infected [7]. “Closed” means that the devices just 
make calls and have a simple address book but do not have the ability to install third-party 
applications. 
 Web browsing increases the possibility of infection. Devices that enable third-party 
application installation without OS restriction are at high risk for infection. The cost of a lost 
device is small in comparison to the loss caused by compromised sensitive data. Such loss can 
cause diminished customer confidence, financial loss, and brand damage.  
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 Infection can occur or spread through any of the following:  
1. Inserting infected external media card. 
2. Synchronizing with a PC that installs an infected file [7]. 
3. Web downloads [7]. 
4. Bluetooth communication etc. 
5.0 Best Practices 
 Most mobile phones operate on a corporate network but are disconnected for a long 
period of time and often change locations. Therefore, it is essential that corporate companies take 
care to prevent loss of personal sensitive information while reaping the benefits of increased 
productivity.  
 The following practices will help users take advantage of available smartphones while 
minimizing the security risks [7]. 
1. If a mobile phone is lost or stolen, the service provider or phone manufacturer should 
provide a device management feature to “wipe” all data.  
2. Devices accessing corporate IT resources should access remote information over 
VPNs for secure access.  
3. Only authorized applications should be provided access to the network. Authorization 
may be based on a user-prompted password before access begins. Authorization 
should not be limited to the user’s acceptance at installation time. 
4. Sensitive data in transit should always be encrypted. In addition, sensitive data on the 
phone—such as calendar entries, phonebook contacts, product prices, customer 
orders, and so on—should be encrypteds.  
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5. Smartphones should be shipped with antivirus software installed. This software 
should have a feature that scans for third-party downloaded apps that keep running 
for a long time and consistently access sensitive and private information. The virus 
scan software should stop such applications and inform the user of such activity, 
giving him or her the option of uninstalling it. Notable smartphone antivirus software 
includes McAfee for Microsoft Windows Mobile devices, and Symantec Mobile 
security for Symbian. 
6. Risk assessment should be done before a business adopts the latest trend of mobility 
through smartphones. 
7. User education and training is essential to make users aware of the risks and liabilities 
involved when using smartphone applications. 
6.0 Experiment Details and Results 
We have been successful in demonstrating Android’s security limitations by exploiting 
Android’s telephony security. In addition, as mentioned in Section 2.5, the lack of security when 
dealing with data stored externally has been considered, and a defense has been developed to 
provide privacy to applications when handling external storage media.  
6.1 Exploiting telephony security 
We have implemented an Android activity and a receiver application which exploits the 
current telephony security of the Android phone. This application intercepts any incoming call 
and sends SMS to all the phonebook contacts with details of the call. Further, the application 
receives a broadcast of an outgoing call and aborts this call.  
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The permissions required by our application are mentioned in the Androidmanifest.xml, 
as shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. XML Permissions for telephony exploitation 
 
 When the application is installed on the phone, the user is notified of these permissions, 
as shown in Figure 5. It is up to the user whether he or she wants to install the application or not. 
It is very easy to deceive a novice user by promising a false set of features. This will often cause 
the user accept all the enlisted permissions that the malicious application uses. 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE" /> 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE" 
/> 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE" 
/> 
<uses-permission 
android:name="android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS" /> 
<uses-permission 
android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION" /> 
<uses-permission 
android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS"></uses-permission>  
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS"></uses-
permission> 
<uses-permission 
android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"></uses-
permission> 
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Figure 5. Install time notification of permissions 
6.2 Tapping incoming call 
The first malicious attack of the application is that it intercepts any incoming call (the call 
might be accepted or it might be a missed call). On intercepting the call, the application obtains 
the details of the incoming call’s number. To make this a breach of privacy, upon getting this 
notification, the application fetches all phonebook contacts and sends SMS to all these contacts. 
This message is sent silently in the background without the knowledge of the mobile phone user.  
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To send SMS on an incoming voice call notification, we need to override the method 
“onCallStateChanged” of Android’s “PhoneListener” class. Figure 6 depicts our implementation 
for this, along with the registering for notifications of change in call state. 
 
 
Figure 6. Code for receiving incoming voice call number and registering for notification 
 
This is followed by fetching the phonebook contacts. There is a CONTACTS content 
provider in the framework that contains the table People. From this table, we fetch the phone 
numbers of all the contacts.  
Whenever we receive an incoming voice call notification, we send SMS to all the 
contacts. Our SMS message includes the phone number of the calling party. Figure 7 indicates 
// TelephonyManager 
final TelephonyManager telMgr = (TelephonyManager) 
getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE); 
 
this.telMgrOutput.setText(telMgr.toString()); 
previousState = telMgr.getCallState(); 
 
// PhoneStateListener 
PhoneStateListener phoneStateListener = new PhoneStateListener() { 
        
@Override 
public void onCallStateChanged(final int state, final String 
incomingNumber)  
{ 
telMgrOutput.setText(getTelephonyOverview(telMgr,incoming
Number)); 
  
if(state == TelephonyManager.CALL_STATE_IDLE && 
(previousState == TelephonyManager.CALL_STATE_RINGING || 
previousState == TelephonyManager.CALL_STATE_OFFHOOK)) 
{ 
  sendSMS(incomingNumber); 
} 
       previousState = state; 
} 
}; 
 
// Registering to receive incoming call notifications 
telMgr.listen(phoneStateListener, 
PhoneStateListener.LISTEN_CALL_STATE); 
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the form of the SMS message being sent by our application. To send the SMS, one needs to use 
the “SMSManager” class of Android. This class provides a method “sendTextMessage” in which 
we specify the text message and the receiver’s phone number. A code sample is shown in Figure 
8. In our demo application, we have a GUI display the current call state and any incoming call 
number. This is shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 7. Message sent on new incoming call 
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Figure 8. Code for SMS sending 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Incoming voice call notification 
PendingIntent sentPI = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(this, 0, new 
Intent("SMS_SENT"), 0);            
SmsManager sms = SmsManager.getDefault(); 
//sending message to all phone contacts 
for(int i = 0; i < phoneNo.size(); i++) { 
  sms.sendTextMessage(phoneNo.get(i), null, "You don't have to 
ever spy on me. I'll let you know who am I talking to. I received 
call from "+ number, sentPI, null); 
        } 
 
  
21 
6.3 Aborting outgoing voice call 
A second malicious attack involves aborting any outgoing call. To get notification of 
outgoing calls, we registered a class in the application as a broadcast receiver in 
AndroidManifest.xml. This is depicted in Figure 10. This class is derived from the class 
“BroadcastReceiver” and overrides the method “onReceive”.  
 
Figure 10. XML registering for outgoing call notification 
 Now when the user tries to dial, our overridden method receives the notification, and it 
aborts the call. This is done by calling the method “abortBroadcast”. This method will prevent 
any other broadcast receivers from receiving the broadcast. As a result, the basic telephony 
application is not receiving the event of an outgoing call and, therefore, the user cannot dial a 
number. Figure 11 shows the notification that is displayed by our application when intercepting 
and aborting an outgoing call. 
6.4 Validation 
The above telephony exploitation application could have been installed under a false 
claim of beneficial features. However, the above two malicious attacks indicate that once an 
application is installed, it can have unpredictable behavior making this a Trojan horse attack. The 
operating system has no control over preventing such attacks.  
<receiver android:name=".OutgoingCallReceiver"> 
<intent-filter> 
<action android:name="android.intent.action.NEW_OUTGOING_CALL" /> 
</intent-filter> 
</receiver> 
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Figure 11. Outgoing voice call aborted 
 
7.0 Security Feature for Android 
As mentioned in Section 2.5, every Android application owns a private area of memory 
on the internal file system. As a result, every owner application has permission only to read and 
write files that it creates. This is because the files are created in the default private mode; that is, 
MODE_PRIVATE. No other application can access this file unless the owner application 
explicitly grants a global read-write access using the modes MODE_WORLD_READABLE and 
MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE. 
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However, this feature is not applicable to files stored on external media such as a Secure 
Digital (SD) Card. This means that if a private file needs to be stored on the SD card by an 
application, then such a file is accessible to any other application. It is common for applications 
on an Android phone to use external media for storing data since the internal phone memory is 
small—no more than 512MB on Nexus One [18]. Therefore, we have developed a solution to 
provide privacy access to files stored on the external media just as the framework provides for 
phone memory files. 
7.1 Encryption of files stored on SD card 
To overcome this limitation of storing easily unprotected files on the external memory, 
we have introduced an API that can be extended as a library and used by other Android 
applications looking for such a feature.  
To use this feature, the application needs to call the library interface with the name of the 
file to be encrypted and a password. Every file stored on the media card is encrypted the first 
time by a randomly generated key. To enable decryption, the key needs to be persistent. Since 
we are trying to emulate the private access feature of the internal file system, we have stored the 
key in the application’s private file space. The password provided to the interface is used to 
protect the encryption key. 
The encryption algorithm works as follows:  
1. The encryption algorithm selected is DES.  
2. A symmetric key is generated for the purpose of encryption. This is done by using 
the KeyGenerator class of Java. We assume this provides enough randomness and 
generates a hard-to-guess key. Using this as the encryption key, the data to be stored 
on the external media card is encrypted and stored on the card.  
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3. From the password entered by the user, a hash is computed. The hashing algorithm 
used is MD5. This generates a 128-bit hash value. 
4. The computed hash value serves as the key for encrypting the symmetric key. The 
encrypted symmetric key is stored on the internal phone memory within the 
application’s privately accessible file space. 
We define E(data,key) to mean that the algorithm encrypts “data” with the “key” and 
h(password) denotes a cryptographic hashing function. Then the above algorithm is as follows: 
KeyGenerator(“DES”)       SymmetricKey 
E(Data to store on SD Card, SymmetricKey)    Encrypted Data  on SD Card 
E(SymmetricKey, h(Password entered by the user))   Encrypted Key stored on phone 
memory in the application’s private file 
space. 
Figure 12 is the code sample for encryption of file data and storing of the key in the 
private file space. 
To demonstrate encryption, we have created our own user interface, as seen in Figure 13. 
The user needs to specify the name of the file that he or she wants to encrypt along with the 
password. The password is hashed and serves as a key for encrypting the symmetric key.  
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For the purpose of this example, since we do not have access to the private files of the 
phone, the files to be encrypted are on the SD Card. The file selected in Figure 13 is stored after 
encryption as “AalIzzWell_encrypted.mp3,” and its corresponding encrypted symmetric key is 
stored in the application’s private directory as “AalIzzWell_key.txt.”  
 
 
Figure 12. Code for encryption 
String algorithm = "DES"; 
Cipher c1 = Cipher.getInstance(algorithm); 
SecretKey myKey = KeyGenerator.getInstance(algorithm).generateKey(); 
c1.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, myKey); 
encrypted = c1.doFinal(fileText); 
    
//encrypt the key and store that on the local storage 
String name = 
fileName.substring(0,fileName.lastIndexOf('.'))+"_key.txt"; 
FileOutputStream outStream = openFileOutput(name, MODE_PRIVATE); 
    
byte[] raw = myKey.getEncoded(); 
//store the raw bytes of the encrypted key 
SecretKeySpec keySpec = new 
SecretKeySpec(hashPassword(passCode),0,8,algorithm); 
    
SecretKeyFactory keyFactory = 
SecretKeyFactory.getInstance(keySpec.getAlgorithm()); 
 
Key key = keyFactory.generateSecret(keySpec); 
c1.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key); 
byte[] encryptedKey = c1.doFinal(raw); 
outStream.write(encryptedKey); 
outStream.close(); 
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Figure 13. Encryption of file on external media 
7.2 Encryption limitations 
Some limitations of this encryption process are: 
1. Encryption will work only if the SD Card is not being used as a USB storage medium 
by the computer to which the phone is connected. In this event, the user is notified, as 
in Figure 14, that no SD Card is available on the phone. The reason for this limitation 
is that the Android framework does not want to get into the situation of handling 
synchronization issues; to avoid this, the external card is locked for the device to 
which it is available. To continue, one can just scroll down the notification panel and 
switch off the USB storage, as seen in Figure 15.  
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2. For file sizes greater than 2MB, the current encryption APIs are slow and can fail. We 
are using the Cipher class in Java Development environment for the purpose of 
encryption. It appears that this is due to the limited memory available on the phone, 
most of which the encryption process consumes. 
 
Figure 14. External media unavailable on encryption 
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Figure 15. Switching off USB storage 
7.3 Decryption algorithm 
The decryption process works in the complete reverse order of encryption. The algorithm 
can be broadly outlined as:  
D(Encrypted symmetric key file stored on application’s private file space, h(Password entered 
by the user))         SymmerticKey  
D(Encrypted file, SymmetricKey)       Original File 
 
Figure 16 shows an encrypted file selected from the SD card after the user has entered the 
password. In case the password entered is incorrect, the user is notified that the SecretKey used 
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for encryption is unobtainable. This happens due to “BadPaddingException” thrown when trying 
to obtain the SecretKey. Figure 17 is an example of this scenario. The decrypted file of Figure 16 
is Diya_decrypted.jpg. 
 
 Figure 16. Decryption successful  
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
Figure 17. Decryption failure 
7.4 Validation 
To validate our encryption feature, we have checked the encrypted and the decrypted 
versions of various files. We have also tried the above process in different file formats such as 
mp3, jpg, and txt.  
The encrypted versions of mp3 and jpg are not in the corresponding file format as these 
do not open with their respective file viewers. These files were rejected as being non-supported 
formats. In addition, the encrypted txt file includes non-readable characters. 
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On decrypting any of these encrypted versions, we found that we obtained our original 
data. Thus, this validates our technique of making external data securely available to an 
application. 
8.0 Conclusion 
With the current security architecture, most smartphones are vulnerable to attacks 
because the user of the phone is instrumental in deciding on applications to be installed on the 
phone. It is not easy for a user to judge applications by their description. The Android framework 
is one platform that expects the user to be security conscious and implicitly assumes application 
developers are not sinister. Because of this, a user may unknowingly install software that poses a 
security threat. Our telephony application provides such an example. 
To free the user from making decisions as to which applications to install, the security 
framework could introduce the concept of a runtime check for each application. Any application 
not behaving in the expected manner would then raise an alarm.  
We also observed that the Android security framework is confined to the storage media 
available on the phone. We extended this security to the external media. 
 We conclude that the Android security framework is susceptible to vulnerabilities and has 
scope for improvement. We believe that the Android security framework needs to extend its 
static install time “Permission”-based security model to a more dynamic runtime security 
provider and also incorporate security for external storage mediums.  
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